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Abstract. The book is a major contribution to Islamic economic history and to Islamic 
economics in the English language. It presents a comprehensive yet concise economic 
hermeneutic of policies implemented by the Messenger (saas) in Medinah. It is an 
authoritative presentation based on the Qur‟an, the Traditions of the Messenger, earliest 
writings of Muslim historians and jurists. Within the context of contemporary economic 
universe of discourse, the book discusses implications of policies of the Messenger with 
regards to allocation of resources, production, exchange, growth, development, 
environment, efficiency and justice. For those who think that zakat, prohibition against 
interest, waqf and the like are the only elements that distinguish an Islamic economy from 
other systems, the depth and the breadth of the book would provide a transformative 
experience. This Review argues that the appearance of the book is particularly timely given 
the distorted, dis-embedded, and fictitious model of an Islamic economy manufactured by 
Orientalists. The book will go a long way in correcting these distortions. 
Keywords. History of economic thought, Macroeconomy, Macroeconomic policy, 
Economic policy, Economic history, Economic systems, Political economy. 
JEL. B10, E40, E60, N10, P40, P48.  
 
1. Introduction 
or those familiar with the writings of Professor Sadr, the appearance of this 
book in English had been much awaited. More than three and half decade in 
the making, the book is indeed what Palgrave Macmillan Editors of the 
series in Political Economy of Islam call “invaluable contribution” and “a unique 
and major piece of research” (see the foreword to the book). These words are no 
exaggeration. To the best knowledge of this reviewer, this is the first 
comprehensive yet concise book by a Muslim Scholar in English on this topic. The 
author swims effortlessly in the oceans of history of Islam and the economics of its 
earliest period as well as that of the Qur‟an, Hadith and Fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence). Evidence is the book‟s seamless journey through time: from the 
writings of Ibn Hisham, Ibn Hajar Al-Asghalani, Hakim Naishaburi, Al-Mawardi 
and Ibn Al-Qudama to Keynes, Friedman, and Becker. Readers will experience the 
same seamless movement from deep concepts of Fiqh to contemporary economic 
theory.  
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A competent analyst, Sadr covers a vast topic in less than 300 pages, beginning 
with the pre-Islamic socioeconomic and cultural history of the Arabian Peninsula 
showing concretely and analytically how the rules and institutions of the economy 
changed comprehensively in that area by the Qur‟an and the policies of the 
Messenger (saas). Up to now, the field, in terms of published works in English, has 
been left to Weberiani and Marxists Orientalists writers. Muslim scholars, by and 
large, have not shown a great deal of interest in the economic history of the early 
Islamic period. Professor Murat Cizakca is an exception in that his recent book 
(2011) uses extensive evidence from the Qur‟an, Sunnah and economic history to 
argue two major points. First that, contra Weberians, Islam is not responsible for 
economic underperformance of Muslim countries. What is responsible is the 
cumulative effects of path dependency of deviation of practice from the ideal; the 
central idea of Muslim reformers for more than a century. The second point 
Cizakca argues is that if capitalism is defined by protection of property rights, 
contract enforcement and good governance, then the economic system in place in 
Muslim countries from seventh to the thirteenth centuries was capitalism derived 
from the teachings of the Qur‟an and the Sunnah of the Messenger (saas). While 
the objectives and approach of the two books differ, they complement one another. 
Readers would gain a deep sense of dynamism of the ideal Islamic economy from 
reading the two books.ii 
The objective of the “book is to provide an authentic model of an Islamic 
economy.”iii That model is a coherent framework gleaned from the policies of the 
Messenger (saas) who operationalized the Qur‟an‟s abstract and immutable vision 
of an economy. The first two chapters of the book deal with the history of the 
Arabian Peninsula before Islam up to the time of migration of the Messenger (saas) 
and his followers to Medinah. A unique feature of these chapters is that it sheds 
light on the social reforms of the Messenger‟s grandfather, Abdul-Motallib, aimed 
at improving social solidarity and social stability. The important role of this social 
reformer has been ignored or not emphasized enough by Muslims and Orientalist 
writers even though the importance of some of the institutions (see pages 14-17 of 
the book for the list) he established have been acknowledged. Overall, the two 
chapters provide a short but comprehensive glimpse of socioeconomic conditions 
of Mekkah and the position of the Messenger (saas) before and at the inception of 
Islam.  
Chapter 3 covers the migration (Hijrah) of the Messenger (saas) and his 
followers from Mekkah to Medinah. One of this chapter‟s unique contributions is 
the coverage and analysis of one of the most important documents in human 
history: the Constitution of Medinah, the first written and extant social contract in 
the history of humanity.iv  The preamble of this document declares that Muslims 
and non-Muslim residence of Medinah constitute an Ummahv, an astonishing 
contrast with the present sorry and deplorable state of inter-religion relationships. 
In Chapter 3, Sadr discusses the rules promulgated by the Messenger governing the 
rights and responsibilities of Muslims and non-Muslim inhabitants of the city-state. 
Once the historic background to the subject is firmly grounded, the remaining 
chapters (4-12) of the book turn to collating all the elements of the institutional 
scaffolding of economy designed and implemented by the Messenger based on the 
rules prescribed by the Allah swt in the Qur‟an. Within the context of the economic 
universe of discourse, the author analyzes the implications of each rule for physical 
and human capital allocation, growth and development, environment, efficiency 
and justice employing contemporary analytic economic tools. For those who think 
of an Islamic economy as one differentiated from a capitalist economy only by 
existence of institutions such as zakat, prohibition against interest, and the 
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institution of waqf, chapters 4-12 of the book are sure to be a revelation and a 
waking call.   
As it often happens when reading a truly significant book, one is left thirsty for 
more and this book is no exception. The book‟s policy recommendations for 
Muslim countries of today, based on the Medinah model, would be enlightening for 
a world thirsty for a new economic and finance paradigm. But that would mean a 
much larger book. A strong positive response to the present book may persuade the 
author to address this issue in another book. For now, however, the book is a timely 
contribution to correcting the distorted image of the Islamic model of the economy 
currently in vogue. To argue why this is the case, the remainder of this review will 
focus on the present deconstructed, dis-embedded and highly distorted image of the 
model created by contemporary Orientalists. 
 
2. Orientalists’ ersatz model of an Islamic economy 
Sadr‟s book is especially timely given the current ferocity of attacks on 
anything Islamic. Even to Muslims aware of the history of a millennium and half 
anti-Islam rhetoricvi, the intensity of the present dawning of the “age of unreason” 
of the “West against Islam” in the twenty-first century “global village” is baffling. 
Muslims, by and large, have been aware of misrepresentation of Islam by 
Orientalists writers, such as Bernard Lewis and his “native informant” followers.vii 
However, until recently, apparently no Muslim scholar considered these view 
worthy of response. This “silence of the natives” left the field wide open for the 
ideologically based, quasi-intellectual works of Orientalists missionaries. The task 
of unmasking the “charlatanism” of these writers was left to the Palestinian-
American scholar, Edward Said whose book Orientalism is now a classicviii. 
The essence of Said‟s argument is that these “charlatans,” unwilling or unable 
to understand the Islam of the Qur‟an, create a “fictitious Islam”, an ersatz Islam 
with its own fictitious “Islamic Law”ix as a straw man. This “vulgarization of 
Islam”x then becomes the subject of their robust criticism. Said argues that this 
“Islam” in the Orientalist discourse is part fiction, part ideological, and part 
minimal designation of a religion called Islam. xi  To erect the ersatz Islam, 
Orientalists select a few institutions from “Islamic law,” which they often conflate 
with Islam, to serve their agenda. For Bernard Lewis‟ ersatz socio-political model 
of Islam these are the concepts of “fitna” and “bid‟a”; the former inhibits 
development of democracy while the latter prohibits progress through 
innovationxii .  The ersatz Islamic economy supplements Lewis‟ socio-political 
conception by adding five other institutions, prohibition against interest, zakat, 
waqf, Islamic contract law, and inheritance law, all taken out of their original 
context. As Sadr‟s book makes clear, these four institutions are essential and 
inseparable elements of the totality of the model implemented by the Messenger 
(saas) in Medinah. Sadr explains, using contemporary analysis, how this model 
insures stability, sustainability, efficiency, growth and prosperity with justice.  
The Orientalist ersatz Islam deconstructs and dis-embeds the essentials of Islam. 
Talal Asad suggest, this “de-essentialization” of Islam is necessary to the mission 
of the liberal, secularist, new-Orientalists: remaking Islamic tradition “in the image 
of liberal protestant Christianity” xiii  Secularism is a crucial element of the 
narrative of Orientalism‟s ersatz Islam as the inhibitor of development compared to 
economic evolution of the West. In essence, secularism‟s ostensible aim is the 
separation of sacred from secular or at least privatizing religion and secularizing 
public life. Kuran (2011, pp. xi-xii) stresses that secularism is a precondition for 
capitalism. He argues (p. 7) that “the identifiable handicaps” created by “Islamic 
law” for “investors, merchants, artisans, or money lenders” could have been 
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“circumvented” by “secularization” of “commerce and finance.” The message is 
clear: secularism led to capitalism and rapid development of the West while 
Muslim countries diverged from the West and fell behind because secularism and 
capitalism did not develop in these countries. Choice of the West as a benchmark is 
axiomatic in the Orientalists‟ thought. Hence “in exploring links between economic 
failures” and Islam, the “West serves as the primary basis for comparison because 
it is where the modern economy gradually took shape.” (p. xi). Other Orientalists‟ 
rhetoric is more blunt. For example, Huff (1999, p. 15) asserts that “those Muslim 
countries (both with or without massive oil reserves) which seek to embark upon 
the path of economic development have to jettison virtually all aspects of Islamic 
law that relate to business and commercial activities.” There is no hope for 
Muslims, according to this line of thought, to exit their wretched economic 
backwardness unless they de-essentialize Islam, “a religion now widely viewed as 
a source of backwardness, ignorance, and oppression.” (Kuran, 2011, p. xi). There 
is, however, good news. Muslims have been borrowing “key institutions of modern 
capitalism” by stealth. They have disguised these institutions in the process of 
adopting them so that they become “culturally acceptable, even to self-consciously 
anti-modern Islamist.” This help Muslims to secularize without “opposing Islam as 
a religion, or even dealing with it.” (Kuran, 2011, p. 302). The arrogance is 
breathtaking. 
 Orientalism inherited its anti-Islam ideology from the Enlightenment 
secularism with its rhetoric going back to the anti-Islam polemics of the Middle 
Ages and even further back to the origin of Islam.xiv Jakobsen & Pellegrini (2008, 
pp. 2-3) suggest that the claim “that Islam is responsible for the violence in today‟s 
world is deeply indebted to the fact that the idea of secularism, with its claim of 
universal reason, is accepted as common sense powerful protection against Islam.” 
In a recent book, Joseph Massad argues “Islam is at the heart of liberalism, at the 
heart of Europe. It was there at the moment of the birth of liberalism and the birth 
of Europe. Islam is indeed one of the conditions of their emergence as the identities 
they claim to be. Islam… resides inside liberalism, defining its identity and its very 
claims of difference. It is an internal constituent of liberalism, not merely an 
external other, though liberalism often projects it as the latter” [p. 1]. He further 
observes that regardless of the point of origin of Europe, Islam “seems to have a 
foundational role” [p. 15]. Massad echoes Roberto Dainotto (2007) who observes 
“a theory of Europe, from its very outset, is a theory of Orientalism” as it 
differentiates itself as opposite of Islam and the Orient; an essential element for the 
“European project” [pp. 18-19.]. In short, without Islam, Western liberalism seems 
inconceivable. It owes its very existence as well as “its current legitimation as a 
global ideological system” to its anti-Islam identity (Massad, 2015, p.1). However, 
in a recent book, historian Larry Siedentop (2015) argues that Western liberal 
secularism was promoted by Christian moral beliefs and urges “those who live in 
nations once described as part of Christendom” and who “seem to have lost their 
moral bearing” to “look at the West against a global background” to see “that we 
are in a competition of belief” against Islam “a worldview in which religious law 
excludes a secular sphere” [p.1]. Note that according to Siedentop, liberal 
secularism‟s emergence is tied to a religion (Christianity) and to a specific region 
and culture (Europe). 
The subject of non-universal and geographically particular characteristics of 
secular liberalism and its link to a particular culture and religion owes much to the 
classic contribution of Max Weber (1958). Secularism, according to Weber, 
liberated markets from religion. However, Jakobsen & Pelligrini argue (2008, p. 2-
3) that the market “was not fully secular but was, in fact, tied to a specific form of 
religious activity—reformed Protestantism.” Weber singled out the practice of 
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what he called “worldly asceticism,” practice of self-control against worldly 
passions, as the most important characteristic of Calvinism that contributed to the 
emergence of capitalism. Jakobsen and Pelligrini note that practicing worldly 
asceticism while engaging in market activity was demonstration of “an already 
achieved salvation promised in Calvinistic predestination. Thus it could form a 
practice at once secular and religion.” Consequently, they argue “secularism 
remains tied to a particular religion, just as the secular calendar remains tied to 
Christianity.” They then ask if secularism claims and promises universality, then 
“what does it mean that this universalism and the rationality it embodies are 
actually particular (to European history) and religious (Protestant) in form?” Based 
on these arguments, since the Orientalists argue that secularism is a pre-condition 
for capitalism and, yet, secularism and, by extension, capitalism are culture and 
religious bound, the argument of Orientalists that the only way for Muslim 
countries to converge economically to the West is to secularize in effect means to 
abandon Islam for another religion.xv  
 A chief characteristic of the Orientalist mission is a willful ignorance of the 
Qur‟an and the social, political, cultural and economic system it envisions for 
human society. Nor do they seem to be much familiar with the model of the 
economy established by the Messenger (saas) in Medinah, as described by 
Professor Sadr in his book. As Abou El Fadhl observes, these writers appear to 
have “an epistemic block” in understanding the authentic Islamic system. Aware 
Muslims will not be persuaded by the “smoke and mirror” delusional ersatz Islam 
of Orientalists. This begs the question, for whom are they writing? Orientalists 
provide part of the answer themselves. They write for each other (as Bernard Lewis 
asserted in his debate with Edward Said in New York Times Review of Books, 
August 12, 1982). As well, Crone & Cook (1977) declare in the preface to their 
book, Hagarism: “This is a book by infidels for infidels. Our account is not merely 
unacceptable; it is also one which any Muslim whose faith is as a grain of mustard 
seed should find no difficulty in rejecting.” This applies equally to more 
convoluted and more nuanced fiction masquerading as historical analysis with 
covert agenda. A second group addressed is uninformed or ill-informed Western 
readers for the purpose of usual “dehumanization” propaganda that precede 
aggressive intervention by their governments, as was done in case of Iraq invasion 
whose chief “academic” ideologue was Bernard Lewis and his followers. 
It may be argued by some that Orientalist writers render a service since their 
criticism would help Muslim countries to reform. There is neither an attempt here 
to reject the idea that these countries need reform nor that some among these 
writers may have a genuine interest in reform of Muslim societies. The point is that 
their approach is epistemologically misguided and methodologically wrong.xvi 
Muslims are aware that their societies are in need of reform, but a reformed 
Muslim society is not one described by the Orientalists. An ersatz model based on 
selective history of a very limited number of Muslim countries, whose historical 
record is hardly reflective of a society that the Qur‟an envisions, could not be 
expected to convince anyone, except the uninformed. Those who have no agenda 
other than genuine concern about the economic wellbeing of Muslims should 
consider the advice of another (exceptional) Orientalist, Bishop Kenneth Cragg 
who argues: “What hallows and dignifies Islam is from its own sources, what 
weighs upon Muslims of religious stress must be relieved in their own context. 
Islam belongs to Muslims and Muslims to Islam whether in the joy of assets or the 
register of debits, if such are the terms we use. Muslims need and want to be 
Islamically secure and secured. The terms of their present inner crisis belong with 
their historic inter-possession of faith by faithful, of truth by troth. Wise 
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relationship from outside must, therefore, learn to come within” (Cragg, 2005, P. 
9). 
There have been many valuable diagnostics of Muslims‟ “inner crisis” offered 
by Muslims themselves in the past many decades including those of contemporary 
scholars like, Allawi, Abou El Fadhl (2014), Cizakca (2011), Davutoglu (1993), 
and M. Umar Chapra (2010). These and many other writings of Muslims are 
usually ignored by Orientalists. But those who are interested in reform of Muslim 
societies and are willing to “come within” would do well to start with Professor 
Sadr‟s book to understand the benchmark against which Muslims themselves 
measure reforms. For, the authentic and ideal societal structure, as well as its 
institutional scaffolding, is the one envisioned in the Qur‟an and established, in a 
manner appropriate for that time, by the Messenger (saas) in Medinah. The core 
immutable principles of that model, covered well in the book under review, 
establishes the framework of reform of current Muslim societies.    
 
 
Notes 
 
i Weberian writers follow Max Weber‟s methodology of explaining why capitalism developed only in 
the West and not in other cultures. Weber„s criticism of Islam focuses on what he calls “Islamic 
law” as the fundamental reason why capitalism and its precondition, secularism, did not develop in 
Muslim countries. Orientalist writers that analyze socio-economic-political “backwardness” of 
Muslim countries follow Weber. Orientalists, in general, deny divinity of Islam, Qur‟an and the 
divine appointment of the Messenger (saas). They believe in the superiority of Western culture, 
society and economy. Generally, they blame Islam for the “backwardness” of Muslim countries. 
Marxists among them believe that the economy of the Arabian Penninsula, before Islam and, for a 
period, after Islam was merchant capitalism. The march of the economy, according to this view, 
from merchant capitalism to industrial capitalism, and eventually to socialism, was interrupted by 
the regression of the economy, after the Messenger, from merchant capitalism to feudalism (a 
reverse of the movement in the European economy). For examples of Marxist Orientalist writing 
see, Rodinson (1974) and Ibrahim (1990). An interesting recent book credits Islam with the birthing 
of capitalism, see, Koehler (2014). Weber argues that four elements constituted the main reason 
why Islam was inimical to development of Western capitalism in Muslim countries: argument is 
that four factors, “Sultanism,” lack of worldly asceticism, lack of rational law, and inflexibility of 
Islam were responsible for the absence of secularism and capitalism in Muslim countries and, 
hence, for the backwardness of Muslim countries (see, for example, his two-volume book, 
Economy and Society, edited by Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley). Weberians share this 
view. For example Timur Kuran agrees, for the most part, with these reasons and expands on the 
inflexibility factor by interpreting it as “myth of timeless perfection.” This “myth,” according to 
Kuran, “may serve, and has served, as a rationale for immobility.” In turn, the “presumption of 
perfection” prohibits any progress through innovation, most importantly technological innovation, 
since “in an already flawless social order, innovation cannot yield benefits and may well do harm” 
(see, Kuran, 2007, p. 20). The book under review and its coverage of extensive innovations that 
were implemented by the Messenger (saas) in Medinah should be informative. 
ii See, Cizakca (2011). Two other books that are worth consulting are: Ahmad (1944) and Hasan-uz-
Zaman (1981).  
iii See the preface to the book by Askari and Zahedi, p. ix. 
iv A recent valuable contribution is made by John Andrew Morrow in which he presents translations 
of all the covenants of the Messenger (saas) with the Christian communities in the countries of the 
Middle East of the time. Translation of the content of the Constitution is presented on pp. 29-39. 
See also, Serjeant (1965). 
v  The Prophetic view reflected in the preamble of the Constitution of Medinah resonates in 
Bedi‟uzzaman Sa‟id Nuri‟s Risale-i Nur (see, for example, Michel (2013, pp.181-194); see also, 
Khuri (1998, pp. 327-336). 
vi On the intensity of the recent anti-Islam rhetoric see, Norton (2013). 
vii  On the concept of “native informants” see Khalid Abou El Fadhl, (2014), who argues that 
Orientalist “Islam-hating enjoys a long and established pedigree” dating back to the period when 
Islam challenged the Persian and Byzantium superpowers (pp.171-175). From that time, Abou El 
Fadl argues, “Islam has become the object of highly motivated socio-cultural processes that were 
hate filled and hate promoting.” In its current manifestation, anti-Islam bigotry has been aided and 
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abetted “by the opportunistic and parasitical celebration and promotion of so-called native 
informants—people who fit the Muslim ethnic and cultural profile.” In academic journals, in media, 
and in public arena, these folks are held up as “archetypal Muslim who gazes in the mirror only to 
discover his/her hideous ugliness (contrasted, of course, to the beauty of the non-Muslim other) and 
then, overcome by tragic destiny, plunges into cathartic self-flagellation (or, more precisely, Islam-
flagellation), which ends with entirely predictable realization that all the ugliness in the mirror, after 
all, is Islam‟s fault.” For an exposition on Bernard Lewis see, Nyang & Abed-Rabbo (1984). 
Among Lewis‟ followers is Timur Kuran who has focused on the economic “underperformance” of 
Muslim countries of the Middle East. See, Kuran (2011). See also, Shayegan (1997). 
viii Said referred to Bernard Lewis and his ilk who create a “fictitious” Islam just to knock it down as 
“charlatans.” See the debate between Said and Lewis in “Orientalism: an Exchange.” In a review of 
Lewis‟ book, “What Went Wrong” (2002), Edward Said referred to the book as “as intellectual and 
moral disaster…completely removed from any direct experience of Islam, rehashing and recycling 
tired Oriental half (or less than) half truths…mischievous ideological fiction that pseudo-experts 
like Bernard Lewis trade in.” (see, Said, 2002, pp. 69-74). 
ix Orientalists use terminologies such as “the holy law,” “Islamic religious law,” “the Sacred law,” 
“the Holy Law of God,” “Islamic jurisprudence,” and even “Shari‟ah” interchangeably and often 
conflate them with Islam itself. There seems to be a cognitive deficit in understanding the position 
of the Qur‟an. In Verse 48: Chapter 5 declares that for everyone Allah swt sent a “manhaj” and a 
“shir‟ah.” The former being a clear pathway to “well-being, goodness and thriving existence” and 
the latter constitutes the network of rules for threading the path. Often the word Shari‟ah is used to 
refer to “manhaj” and Shir‟ah together as “God‟s eternal and immutable law—the way of truth, 
virtue and justice. In essence, Shria‟h is the ideal law in an objective and non-contingent sense, as it 
ought in the divine realm. As, such, Shari‟ah is often used to refer to universal, innate, and natural 
law of goodness.” (Abou El Fadhl, 2014, p. xxxii). There is a major difference between Shari‟ah 
and Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh). The former is divine, infallible and immutable. Fiqh, on the other 
hand, is human, fallible and changes with time and place since it is the result of human effort to 
understand Shari‟ah and apply it to contemporary issues. It is the acceptance of the Shari‟ah as 
explained and implemented by the Beloved Messenger of Allah that makes one a Muslim (see 
Verse 18: Chapter 45).  Bernard G. Weiss in his book, The Spirit of Islamic Law, observes that 
Shari‟ah “constitutes an entire way of life.” Noting that Islam means submission to the Will of 
Allah swt, Weiss observes “Shri‟ah is the divine delineation of the life of submission. To submit to 
God is to follow the path that God has ordained, nothing more and nothing less.” Anglican Bishop, 
Kenneth Cragg (2005) makes a distinction between “Islam” and “islam” and between “Muslim” and 
“muslim.” A “muslim,” he regards as anyone who submits to the Will of the Creator, and a 
“Muslim” as someone who submit to the Will of the Creator as specified in the Shari‟ah given to 
the Messenger of Allah swt. 
x See, Abou El Fadl (2014, pp. 119, 127-128) for his notion of “vulgarized Islam.” 
xi Said (1997). See also Almond (2010). On the ideology of Orientalism see, Hussain (1984). 
xii See note i above. 
xiii Asad (1997a, P.189). See also His books, Formation of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, and 
Modernity, 2003; and, Genealogies of Religion, 1997, especially the last 3 chapters. 
xiv See, Hoyland (1997) and Tolan (2002). 
xv Walter Benjamin argued that capitalism itself became changing Christianity. See also, Goodchild 
(2002); Ross; Eiland & Jennings (2014, p. 165); and Weider (2010). Some argue that economics 
itself has become a religion which John B. Cobb (1998) calls “Economism.” See also, Nelson 
(2001).  
xvi See some of the issues raised in reviews of Kuran‟s books and papers by Muslim scholars, among 
them, Crow (2014); Cizakca (2010); and Malik (2011). 
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